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Tax & Planning

The 10% Increase in Brazil’s Lucro Presumido Tax Regime: Four Practical Options for Your Company

The four paths available under the new presumption coefficients—and the business criteria for weighing each decision.

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What Changed: The Increase in Numbers

Supplementary Law No. 224/2025 (Lei Complementar nº 224/2025 — LC 224/2025) established a 10% increase in the profit-presumption percentages of the IRPJ and the CSLL—Brazil’s corporate income tax (Imposto de Renda da Pessoa Jurídica — IRPJ) and social contribution on net profit (Contribuição Social sobre o Lucro Líquido — CSLL)—for companies under Brazil’s presumed-profit corporate tax regime (Lucro Presumido) with annual gross revenue above R$ 5 million.

In practice, the presumption coefficient for services rose from 32% to 35.2%. For commerce and industry, from 8% to 8.8%. The increase applies to the portion of revenue that exceeds the threshold.

The first quarterly DARF—the payment form used to collect federal taxes in Brazil (Documento de Arrecadação de Receitas Federais)—calculated under the higher percentages came due in April 2026. For the companies affected, this is no longer a future change: they need to measure the impact and decide how to handle the upcoming payments.

LC 224/2025 classified Lucro Presumido as a tax benefit subject to a linear 10% reduction. That classification was implemented through Decree No. 12,808/2025 and through Normative Instructions No. 2,305/2025 and No. 2,306/2026 (Instruções Normativas RFB nº 2.305/2025 e nº 2.306/2026), issued by Brazil’s federal tax authority (Receita Federal do Brasil).

The impact reaches companies with revenue above R$ 5 million per year—R$ 1.25 million per quarter, under IN 2,306/2026. For those below the threshold, nothing changes.

SectorPrevious coefficientIncreased coefficient
Services32%35.2%
Commerce and industry8%8.8%

The increase applies to the portion of revenue that exceeds the threshold, not to total revenue. This matters for calculating the impact correctly.

Option 1: Pay Under the New Coefficients and Monitor the STF

This is the most conservative option. The company pays the DARF using the new coefficients and follows the three direct constitutional challenges (Ações Diretas de Inconstitucionalidade — ADIs) pending before Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal — STF), Brazil’s constitutional court:

  • ADI 7920 (filed by the CNI — Brazil’s National Confederation of Industry, Confederação Nacional da Indústria): challenges Article 4, paragraph 8 of LC 224/2025.
  • ADI 7936 (filed by the CNS — Brazil’s National Confederation of Health, Confederação Nacional de Saúde): challenges Article 4 of LC 224/2025 and provisions of Decree No. 12,808/2025 and IN 2,305/2025.
  • ADI 7944 (filed by the OAB — the Brazilian Bar Association, Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil): challenges the 10% increase in the presumption percentages, with a request for an interim order suspending it immediately.

If the STF declares the increase unconstitutional, in whole or in part, the company will be able to seek a refund of the amounts overpaid, subject to the applicable limitation periods.

Best suited for: companies with a comfortable cash position, relatively low tax exposure, and a preference for avoiding litigation.

Risk: the ruling may take years. The opportunity cost of the capital advanced to the government cannot be recovered.

Option 2: File a Mandado de Segurança

The company asks the courts for authorization to keep paying under the previous coefficients while the question awaits a decision by the STF. The vehicle is the mandado de segurança—a Brazilian constitutional remedy that protects a clear legal right against an unlawful or abusive act by a public authority or an agent exercising public functions.

The case law identified in preparing this analysis is significant. Three trial-level preliminary injunctions have suspended the increase:

  • 1st Federal Court of Resende, State of Rio de Janeiro (MS 5000259-79.2026.4.02.5116): suspended the enforceability of the tax debt, allowing payment under the previous percentages. The court’s reasoning was that Lucro Presumido is a method for calculating taxable income, provided for in Article 44 of Brazil’s National Tax Code (Código Tributário Nacional — CTN), and not a tax benefit.
  • 6th Federal Court of São João de Meriti, State of Rio de Janeiro (MS 5011528-63.2026.4.02.5101): a collective mandado de segurança filed by the Rio de Janeiro chapter of the Brazilian Bar Association (OAB-RJ), benefiting law firms in that state.
  • 26th Federal Civil Court of São Paulo (MS 5004081-07.2026.4.03.6100): an individual preliminary injunction resting on the same central reasoning.

The central legal argument is that Lucro Presumido is a method for determining the tax base, under Article 44 of the CTN, and not a tax benefit. Classifying it as a benefit in order to apply a linear reduction would violate the nature of the regime.

That argument is reinforced by COSIT Advance Tax Ruling No. 6/2026 (Solução de Consulta COSIT nº 6/2026), in which the General Taxation Coordination Office (COSIT) of Brazil’s federal tax authority itself acknowledged that simplified calculation regimes are not to be confused with tax benefits.

Best suited for: companies with significant tax exposure, for which the increase represents a meaningful amount, and a willingness to litigate.

Risk: a provisional decision can be reversed. The company must be prepared to deposit or pay the difference if the injunction is lifted.

Option 3: Migrate to Lucro Real

If the company’s actual profit margin is lower than the increased presumption coefficient, Brazil’s actual-profit corporate tax regime (Lucro Real) may result in a lower tax burden.

A simplified example: a services company with R$ 10 million in revenue and an actual margin of 20%. Under the increased Lucro Presumido, the tax base would be 35.2% of revenue on the portion above the threshold. Under Lucro Real, it would be 20%—the actual margin. The difference is meaningful.

This option requires full accounting records and a detailed analysis with your accountant. Comparing rates is not enough: you need to weigh the deductibility of expenses, tax credits, and the operational complexity of Lucro Real.

From 2027 onward, the replacement of the cumulative PIS/COFINS—Brazil’s federal social contributions levied on revenue—by the CBS (Contribuição sobre Bens e Serviços, Brazil’s new federal tax on goods and services) should also be factored into the comparison between the regimes.

Best suited for: companies whose actual margin is below the increased coefficient and that have the accounting structure to support Lucro Real.

Risk: the election of Lucro Real is irrevocable for the entire tax year. If the analysis is incomplete, it can result in a higher burden.

Option 4: Replan Quarterly Revenue

IN 2,306/2026 set the trigger for the additional charge at R$ 1.25 million per quarter. Companies with seasonal revenue may exceed that threshold in a peak quarter and stay below it in the others.

In that scenario, the company pays the additional amount in the peak months and only recovers it through the adjustment in the last quarter of the year. The early outlay strains cash flow unnecessarily.

Reviewing the billing schedule and evaluating whether to bring forward or defer the issuance of notas fiscais—Brazil’s mandatory tax invoices—can avoid or reduce the early payment of the additional amount.

Best suited for: companies with seasonal revenue or revenue concentrated in specific periods, such as events, project-based work, and harvest cycles.

Risk: tax planning must remain within legal bounds. Artificially deferring revenue can draw challenges from the tax authorities.

How to Decide: Four Questions to Work Through with Your Accountant

  • What is my actual profit margin? If it is below the increased coefficient, Lucro Real may be more advantageous.
  • How much does the 10% increase represent in absolute terms? If the amount justifies the cost of court action, that is an option to consider.
  • Is my revenue seasonal? If so, quarterly planning may avoid unnecessary early payments.
  • What is my risk appetite? Paying and monitoring is the most conservative path. Litigating may be more efficient in absolute terms, but it involves uncertainty.

Conclusion

The current landscape offers grounds to challenge the increase. Favorable trial-level injunctions, pending actions before the STF, and the position stated in COSIT Ruling No. 6/2026 form a picture that deserves close monitoring.

Each company should assess which option best fits its size, industry, profit margin, seasonality, and risk tolerance.

What makes no sense is to let the upcoming payments go through without the company having run the simulation.

Sources Consulted

  • Supplementary Law No. 224/2025 (Lei Complementar nº 224/2025).
  • Decree No. 12,808/2025.
  • Normative Instructions RFB No. 2,305/2025 and No. 2,306/2026.
  • COSIT Advance Tax Ruling No. 6/2026 (Solução de Consulta COSIT nº 6/2026).
  • Mandados de segurança Nos. 5000259-79.2026.4.02.5116, 5011528-63.2026.4.02.5101, and 5004081-07.2026.4.03.6100.
  • ADIs 7920, 7936, and 7944, before the STF.
  • Law No. 9,249/1995, Articles 15 and 20.
  • Brazil’s National Tax Code (Código Tributário Nacional), Article 44.

This content is for information purposes and reflects the sources indicated as of the publication date. It does not replace an analysis of the specific circumstances of each company or case.

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